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I  
 
Abstract 
The paper analyzes incentive compatible task allocation between bureaucrats, central and 
local politicians in conjunction with the type of task. If effort in one task is an input in 
another task, giving the bureaucrat the second task as his objective will ensure the 
completion of both tasks. Compared to central politicians, lower level politicians may 
have more local power so decentralization requires a compensatory rise in local 
monitoring to make them more accountable to the public. Local monitoring is relatively 
easier, but even with it, local politicians put in less effort than local bureaucrats. Showing 
how the analysis can improve the provision of durable assets under the Mahatma Gandhi 
national rural employment guarantee scheme, and more generally improve the quality of 
public services, demonstrates its utility.   
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I. Introduction 
In a democracy a voter as the principal has to achieve results through agents, the 
politicians and bureaucrats, under imperfect information. The paper shows how, with 
context sensitive incentive design, the division of tasks between central and local 
politicians and bureaucrats, can achieve the voter‘s objectives. Recent history has seen 
the failure of both markets and governments. It has also shown that both are required. 
The way forward is to improve the functioning of both. One way to do this is to design 
better incentives. 
 
The field of political economics is concerned with understanding incentives and 
outcomes in different forms of government and their supporting institutions, when agents 
have their own objectives. It recognizes information and other constraints that cause 
policies to differ from optimal policies and leads to a normative research program to 
discover which policymaking institutions produce better policy outcomes and how 
institutions can be changed
1
. Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008) argue that career 
concerns motivate bureaucrats while for politicians the objective is to get re-elected. If a 
bureaucrat‘s career depends on helping politicians achieve their objectives, both would 
have similar objective functions. But designing incentive contracts for bureaucrats can 
divorce the two objective functions. With this divorce, they ask how policy-making 
power should be allotted between bureaucrats and politicians in order to maximize 
aggregate welfare. We further distinguish between a task (task A), which is an input into 
another one (task B), and between a central and a local politician in a federal structure. 
Such task pairs could be one with a short-run and another with a long-run output such as 
the Indian Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(MGNREGS) where short-run employment can be used to create long-run assets. 
Another example is where additional input into the first task improves the quality of the 
output. Improving the quality of public services is one of the most critical unmet needs in 
Indian reforms. 
 
                                                 
1
 Persson and Tabellini (2000) review the field. Some useful papers concerned with task allocation are Hart 
et. al. (1997) who examine the distribution of activities between the public and private sector; Dewatripont 
and Tirole (1999), who explore how to design optimal information extraction from biased participants. 
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The analytical results derived are: Where local politicians are easier to monitor, tasks 
should be decentralized to them, but local monitoring must itself be strengthened to 
prevent capture by parochial elements that otherwise would find little local resistance. 
Increasing political competition and strengthening non-political civic institutions will 
help. If task A and task B share resources, but additional inputs are required for task B, a 
bureaucrat motivated by career concerns or incentives will focus on task A; the politician 
who has to compete with an ―average‖ politician will focus on both tasks. But if task B 
yields results only after elections, or an electoral majority can be achieved with task A, 
the politician will neglect task B. It turns out giving the bureaucrat task B, as his 
objective, will ensure the completion of both tasks. Since task A is required for task B, 
effort must be allocated to task A even if the objective is task B in order to achieve task 
B. The bureaucrat will work even harder if task B requires more skill, and there is high 
variation in the distribution of skill. For local tasks where monitoring is better, local 
politicians put in less effort than local bureaucrats, so motivating the latter improves 
outcomes. After deriving the incentive features we demonstrate some applications, first, 
the functioning of the MGNREGS, and second, improving the quality of public services. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the basic analytical 
framework, develops the public servants‘ objective functions, compares allocation of 
tasks between the local and central agent, and the distribution of financing across agents 
and tasks. Section 3 compares results from allocating the tasks to the local politician or 
the bureaucrat; section 4 examines how leakages can be reduced; section 5 the 
distribution of financing between the two tasks; section 6 demonstrates applications of 
the analysis. Section 7 concludes.   
 
II. The Analytical Framework 
How do voters, who are the principals, extract the best work from their agents, the 
politicians and bureaucrats, each of whom has his own objectives? Agents are 
heterogeneous. A sense of duty may motivate exceptional agents, but the average agent 
must also perform—appropriate task allocation and incentives can induce better 
performance. Beginning with a very general framework, based on Alesina and Tabbelini 
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(2007, 2008), we modify it as required to analyze the issue of local versus central 
government and of tasks that are subsets of others.   
 
A policy outcome y is conditional on effort a of a public servant, his random 
ability, ),(~ 2N  (distributed normally with mean  and variance 
2
) and finance f. 
The three are additive.  
y =  + a + f      (1) 
The public servant could be a bureaucrat B, or a politician P. Citizens get utility from the 
policy outcome according to a simple linear, well-behaved utility function, U(y) = y. 
 
The public servant‘s cost, C (a), is strictly convex and increasing in effort: 
Ca > 0, Caa > 0 
Effort a lies in the domain [0,∞). He gets reward for effort, R, and maximizes own utility: 
R (a) - C (a)                                                              (2) 
Consider a policy outcome that has two components, the output of the first task A is y1, 
and of the second task B is y2. Using y1 to create y2 requires effort a2 additional to the 
effort a1 required to just create y1; y2 requires additional financing f2 over the f1 required 
for y1. So f > f1, f = f1+ f2. A central committee of ministers makes the decision on 
finance. The two policy outcomes are determined by: 
111 fay      (3) 
faay 212      (4) 
The cost function, C(a1, a2)= C1(a1) + D(a1)C2(a2), has C1(0) = C2(0) = 0. Ci(x) is 
increasing and strictly convex in x (> 0) for i = 1, 2 and 
 
     
The D term captures the fact a1 is necessary to produce y2, so effort cannot be undertaken 
for y2 unless a positive value of a1 is chosen. Also y1 and y2 add up to give the full policy 
outcome y, that is, y = y1+ y2. Let y1 be employment and y2 be asset creation resulting 
from employment under MGNREGS. Labour could be used to just dig holes, in which 
case no y2 is created. Durability or quality requires more effort. 
D(a1) = 
1  if  a1 > 0 
0  if  a1 < 0 
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The timing is as follows: first, f and its distribution is determined, second, society 
allocates tasks to the B or the P. Third, the public servant chooses effort before knowing 
his ability, . Fourth, nature chooses  and outcomes are observed. Finally, the reward is 
paid. Since principals can only observe the outcome y, not its composition between effort, 
ability and finance, the agent‘s reward is based on y.  
 
The Politician: If the public servant is a politician, his reward is getting re-elected, and 
for this to happen y must exceed some threshold W. Therefore the benefits of holding 
office equal the probability that y exceeds the threshold W. This in turn equals the 
probability that ability, given effort and finance, is higher than the level required to 
achieve W. The latter is one minus the probability that ability is below the level that 
would give the threshold, when the benefits of holding office are normalized to unity. 
)Pr(1)Pr()( faWWyaR p     (5) 
The threshold W is determined by the alternative available to voters. Since they are 
rational, they know the alternative is electing another politician of average ability, (  
denotes average ability), who can be expected in equilibrium to put in the same amount 
of effort a
e
 and finance ef as the current politician. Therefore: 
ee faW      (6) 
Substituting for W, the politician‘s objective function can be written as: 
)()Pr(1 aCfafa
a
Max ee
 
That is, he maximizes the probability that his ability is above average. The first order 
condition, FOC, (7), obtained implicitly determines his equilibrium effort, a
P
. He puts in 
enough effort so as not to be taken as being below average ability. 
)()( pa aCn       (7) 
Where the density of the normal distribution of , evaluated at its mean, is 
21)(n . 
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Next we bring in a distinction between a central (denoted by subscript C) and a local 
level (L) politician. Performance y differs if a central or a local politician manages the 
task. We introduce noise terms ),0(~ 2
L
NL , ),0(~
2
C
NC  uncorrelated with , but 
22
LC
so that noise is higher with the distant politician. That is, monitoring is more 
imperfect for the distant politician. 
fay LL      (8) 
fay CC      (9) 
The politician‘s objective function is the same, but now the )Pr( Wy  is computed from 
a distribution with a higher variance. The mean of the noise term is zero, so the first order 
condition (7) is changed to: 
)()0,( C
p
a aCn      (10) 
Where the density of the random variable  + ,  
)2(1)0,( 22n     (11) 
is evaluated at the mean of both  and the two s (the mean is 0 for both). It follows that 
since 
LC
: 
)()( LC
p
a
p
a aCaC      (12) 
Since C( ) is a strictly increasing function (12) implies LC
PP
aa . The local politician 
would put in more effort compared to the central politician. The analysis above gives: 
 
Result 1: The central politician will put in less effort compared to the local politician, 
since it is more difficult to monitor the performance of the former. Welfare would be 
maximized if the task were delegated to a local politician.  
 
Now consider f. We assume a larger share of total taxes is raised centrally. With an 
effective decentralization of local public service provision, a large amount of funds 
would be available to transfer to local governments. Financing can come from the central 
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politician
2
, if improved audit reports and budgets raise transparency in its allocation and 
use. But a small share raised through local taxes would improve local incentives to 
monitor. From now on, since we focus on the local bureaucrat and politician, we drop f to 
save notation, coming back to the distribution of f between the two tasks in section 5. We 
assume a local scheme will not be launched unless finances are secured.  
  
The bureaucrat: We postulate the bureaucrat is motivated by career concerns
3
. His 
reward is therefore, the perception of his ability, , conditional on output, which depends 
on expected output in excess of the effort the public expects from him.  
         )())(()( eB ayEyEEaR  
Since the derivative of expected outcome with respect to effort is unity, the FOC from 
maximizing his utility (2) with respect to a is: 
          )(1
B
a aC  
The B‘s participation constraint is: 
0)())(( aCyRE      (13) 
An optimal contract, written ex ante to extract first best effort from the B, differs from the 
career concern model of behaviour, in that it would just satisfy the B‘s participation 
constraint at , and in (14) pay him the amount that would generate the first best level of 
effort a*. 
)())(( *aCyRE      (14) 
But these optimal contracts are difficult to specify in all circumstances. The implicit 
reward under career concern is equivalent to paying the bureaucrat an incentive r based 
on expected outcome Ey, and it may leave the B with some rent, unlike in the optimal 
contract above that extracts all rent. But we assume that C(a*), which ensures the 
                                                 
2
India has three tiers of Government- Central, State and Local. One motive for the Central Government to 
pass the 73
rd
 and 74
th
 constitutional amendments empowering local bodies was in order to enable direct 
monetary transfers to local bodies, bypassing state governments that could be corrupt, or belong to different 
parties. 
3
 Using career concerns to motivate the B. But this will not work if his career depends on the politician, 
since then his objective function, maximization and effort will be identical to that of the politician. The 
local politician would be the relevant one for a local bureaucrat. But the re-election objective of the state 
politician would be similar to that of the local politician; the state politician also has to win in the local 
constituency. 
 7 
participation constraint is satisfied. A strict equality would leave him some rent, but in 
simple cases career concern is equivalent to an optimal contract. Consider his 
optimization (16) if he is paid an incentive (15): 
R
B
(a) = r E y      (15) 
)(aCrEy
a
Max
     (16) 
If r normalized to unity, or the B is given the excess of output over costs as incentive, the 
outcome is 1 = *)(aCa , which is the same as the optimal contract. Next we turn to 
writing such an incentive contract for the B, in our two-output case, and comparing the 
effort induced with that of the P.  
 
III. Comparing the bureaucrat and the politician 
Considering the two outputs, the reward to the B dependent on assessment of ability 
conditional on performance y = y1+ y2, becomes:  
)222()2())(()( 221121
eeeeB aaaaEaayEyEEaR   (17) 
The first order conditions (FOCs) are computed with respect to effort, a, taking as given 
expected effort a
e
. The objective function (2) now becomes (18), which B maximizes 
with respect to a1 and a2.  
 )()()()222( 221112211 aCaDaCaaaaE
ee
   (18) 
Next the equilibrium requirement a = a
e
 is imposed for each of y1 and y2. Equilibrium 
efforts obtained are the FOCs (19) and (20). In this case the B puts double effort for 
producing y1 compared to y2.  
)(2 11
1
B
a
aC       (19) 
)(1 22
2
B
a
aC ;          1)( 1
BaD      (20) 
The result is intuitive since he can produce more y1 for the same effort compared to y2, 
thus getting more reward by increasing a1 relative to a2. 
 
Now consider the politician‘s maximization when we distinguish between the two tasks, 
y1 and y2. The FOC (23), attained through a process of reasoning similar to that earlier for 
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(7) shows that he will put equal effort on the two tasks, working harder than when he had 
only one task.  
)22Pr(1)Pr()( 21 aaWWyaR
p    (21) 
ee aaW 2122      (22) 
)()(
2
2
)2( 221
21
p
a
p
a
aCaCn ;         1)( 1
paD    (23) 
The difference in results from the bureaucrat arises because both a1 and a2 affect the 
politician‘s threshold.   
 
If however, election occurs before y2 is observed, so that P‘s chances of re-election 
depend only on y1, P will put zero effort on y2. This is likely if y2 is a longer-term output. 
Since rational voters expect all politicians to neglect y2, 
eaW 1 , and the FOC valid 
for this case, obtained by maximizing (24), is (25). If a2 gives fruits only after elections 
a2
P
= 0; the politician puts zero effort on the second task. 
)Pr(1)Pr()( 11
ep aWWyaR    (24) 
)(
2
1
)( 11
1
p
a
aCn     (25)  
 If some fraction α of y2 is observed prior to the election, the equilibrium a2
P
 is given 
implicitly by FOC (26). It is positive but less than a1
P
: 
 
)(
2
)2( 22
2
P
a
aCn ;        1)( 1
PaD    (26) 
 
If the major benefits of the second task (for example, creation of durable assets) are 
observed over a longer time horizon, P maybe expected to neglect them. 
  
These results are summarized below: 
 
Result 2: When there are two linked tasks, one requiring higher effort, a bureaucrat 
motivated by career concerns will devote less effort to this task. A politician motivated by 
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re-election will, however, devote equal effort to the two tasks and will work harder given 
more tasks. But if the outcome of one of the tasks is observed only after elections, he will 
devote low or zero effort to this task. Thus both the bureaucrat and the politician would 
neglect the creation of durable assets. 
 
Result 2 helps understand the relative neglect of durable assets and focus on employment 
in the MGNREGS. 
   
If the distribution of y matters for re-election, but the politician needs only to please a 
majority for re-election, how would he distribute y among three sets of voters? 
321 cccay     (27) 
If he gave y/2 to two voters and zero to the third, his reward would be: 
)2Pr()( WyaR p     (28) 
Voters expect the incumbent to follow the above policy if re-elected but the opponent if 
elected follows an unknown redistribution so each voter expects one-third. Then the 
threshold the politician has to cross is
4
: 
)(31 eaW      (29) 
The maximization yields the FOC as usual, but the FOC now implies less equilibrium 
effort from the politician. 
)()(
3
1
2Pr aCay
a
Max e
    (30) 
 
)(
3
2 p
a
p
aC
a
n      (31) 
For example, if the poor eligible for employment insurance form about one-third of the 
population, given his short-term perspective, the politician would produce y1 and one-
                                                 
4
 If 
2
ea
W  then there is no change in the earlier result. FOC (7) continues to be valid. 
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third of y2, and put in less effort compared to (7). He may be able to form a minimal 
coalition supporting his office 
 
Result 3: If a coalition is possible, the politician will redistribute only to the proportion 
of voters necessary for re-election, and put in less equilibrium effort as a consequence. 
 
Since the politician would tend to neglect the second task, can the bureaucrat be made to 
attend to this despite Result 2?  
 
Incentive on the second task: It is possible to assign weights on the bureaucrat‘s tasks as 
in (32): 
21 )1( yyy      (32) 
The B‘s rewards now are:  
))1(2)1(22())(()( 2121
eeB aaaaEyEEaR   (33) 
If the weights are set so that  = 0, the B will focus on his mandate, since that signals his 
ability or gives him his incentive payment
5
. The incentive can be based on y2 observed. 
As usual, we do the maximization, taking expectations as given, and then impose the 
equilibrium requirement that expected effort equals actual effort, to get the FOC (34).  In 
this case since a1 is necessary for y2, y1 is also accomplished, with the B allocating equal 
effort to both. 
)()(1 2211
21
B
aa
aCaC ;        1)( 1
BaD              (34) 
Therefore employment producing durable assets lends itself to a simple and effective 
incentive structure. 
 
Uncertainty in skill: Introducing imperfect monitoring captured as before by a noise 
parameter ε with ),0(~ 2N , and a large variation in ability of the B, the reward for 
the B becomes:   
                                                 
5
 A well-focused target works. The managing director of an oil public sector undertaking remarked in a 
private conversation that corporate governance had improved although the board continued to be friendly 
and non-threatening, simply because they now had to give targets in writing.   
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)())(()( eB aaEyEEaR    (35) 
Where β is the signal to noise ratio, which now discounts the perception of ability. 
1)( 222     (36) 
In this signal extraction problem, a high variance of , increases the signal to noise ratio. 
If β is higher, so is the equilibrium effort of the B. The latter is given by the FOC (37). 
The B works harder since his reward is a linear function of expected ability, conditional 
on performance. He fully internalizes the effect of higher expected ability on his reward. 
If the B is risk neutral (as we have assumed) the reward function is linear. If he is risk 
averse, so that his marginal utility is convex, he would put in even more effort if  is 
more uncertain.   
)( Ba aC       (37) 
 
Now consider the local politician: 
Since     )2(1)( 22L
P
a aC  
While     )()(
222B
a aC  
The denominator
6
 of the first term has a square root of 2 , so for large 2 : 
)()( Ba
P
a aCaC
L  
Consider 2ˆ  such that the two are equal. Then for: 
22 ˆ  , )()( Ba
P
a aCaC
L   or  
BP aa L         (38) 
Since 2  is low for the local politician he would put in less effort compared to the local 
B especially if the latter‘s variance in skill is high. 
 
Result 4: If inputs in a second task build on inputs in a first task as in the MGNREGS, 
putting the former as the bureaucrat’s objective will ensure the completion of both, since 
effort must be allocated to the first task in order to achieve the second task. If the second 
task requires more skill, and there is high variation in the distribution of skill, the 
                                                 
6
 See Kojima (2008) for a formal proof. 
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bureaucrat will work harder. Moreover, the local bureaucrat will work harder than the 
local politician. 
 
IV. Mitigating leakages  
We next consider how corruption, or siphoning off payments meant for the poor can be 
reduced. This is a pervasive feature of government welfare schemes, especially at the 
local level, where local satraps may dominate. Corruption often occurs in a situation 
where the B shares the P‘s objective function (and shares in payoffs he arranges for the 
P). Giving the B an independent career objective will lower this type of leakage, since 
ability own incentives will become more important for him.  
 
The P continues to be concerned about re-election, so he extracts e from government 
schemes since e (more funds available) increases chances of re-election through the 
function H, which increases at a decreasing rate with e: 
 
0,0,0)0( eee HHH  
 
Transaction costs in corrupt schemes are 0 < Ø < 1, so that what the P nets from e is (1- 
Ø)e. The probability of getting caught is given by q(e). This function is convex, 
increasing at an increasing rate with e since the chances of getting caught are higher for 
larger extraction. 
0,0,0)0( eee qqq  
 
The timing is: First, given the politician‘s control over a welfare task, and the functions q 
and H, he decides extraction and effort. Second nature chooses the realization of , and 
finally rewards are obtained. H reduces voters‘ reservation utility or threshold W, since 
more funds increase the incumbent‘s chance of winning elections, so that 
)(eHaW e . Since other politicians are rationally expected to be as corrupt, q 
does not enter W, but if the politician is caught output falls, so y =  + a – q(e). 
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Therefore P‘s objective function is: 
)()1()(
,
aCeyR
ea
Max
    (39) 
))(Pr()( eqaWyyR     (40) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
And the FOC with reference to a is: 
)())()(( paCeqeHn     (41) 
With reference to e it is: 
0)1())()())(()(( PPe
PP eqeHeqeHn   (42) 
This can be written as: 
)()(
))()((
1 P
e
P
ePP
eHeq
eqeHn
   (43) 
 
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium level of extraction e
P
 as a function of the slopes of the q 
and H functions. Since q becomes steeper and H flatter, e
P
 is determined at the unique 
point where the slope of q exceeds that of H by the LHS of (43). The gap falls with Ø, , 
q and rises with H.  
 
q, H 
e e
P 
q 
H 
Figure 1: Equilibrium levels of extraction 
by the politician 
a 
b 
eq
eH
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The figure demonstrates that making the q function steeper (as in the dashed function), or 
making the concave H function flatter, lowers e
P
. The LHS of (43), which is ab in the 
figure, is reduced, also lowering e
P
, if transaction costs Ø rise, H shifts down or q shifts 
up. Transparency in muster rolls, good account keeping, and social audits by the local 
community will change the q function as required, and raise Ø; there will be a high 
probability of being caught even for small extraction, and the transaction costs of 
siphoning off funds will rise. If election-funding reform makes adequate legal money 
available for elections the productivity of e in financing elections will fall; a rise in the 
value of performance, reputation, and probity can all change the H function. As norms 
become stricter, e gets driven to words zero. The MNREGA has built in features that will 
change the q function, and if the scheme is successful, the H function should also be 
affected over time. 
 
Result 5: Giving the bureaucrat an objective function independent of the politician will 
reduce corruption in the bureaucracy. Making illegal funds less productive in financing 
elections, increasing the transaction costs of siphoning off funds, and the probability of 
being caught and making it more sensitive to siphoning, will reduce political corruption. 
 
V. Financing 
A decision has to be made on the distribution of f between f1 and f2, based on the tradeoff 
between current and future payoffs, or between quantity and quality. Let y1 be current 
employment while y2 is output of durable assets. Consider 2 periods t and t+1, f2t does not 
contribute to employment in period t, but by raising productivity in period 2 it makes it 
possible to employ more in that period, as the equation below demonstrates: 
tttt ffay 211111  
 
Figure 2 shows that employment y1 remains constant over time when f2 = 0, but rises over 
time as f2 accumulates when some of f is invested in durable assets. Under the latter 
strategy y1 is initially lower but by time T equals the fixed level of y1 achieved with zero 
durable assets and then exceeds it. T is shorter if f2 is smaller and more productive so that 
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y1 with positive f2 rises faster (the line A y1 in Figure 2 has a smaller intercept and is 
steeper).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
It is possible to derive this share optimally. Consider the case when utility depends only 
on f1 (this could be because poor voters form a very large proportion of the total). Then 
the necessary condition for efficiency in employment creation is the loss in utility from 
the decrease in employment in time t must be equal to the discounted value of the gain in 
utility from the rise in employment in time t+1 due to higher f2. That is, the marginal rate 
of substitution in employment over time must equal the marginal rate of transformation in 
the creation of employment. The rise in employment in period t+1 equals the marginal 
productivity of f2. The employment gain rises with the productivity of durable assets. 
Thus the optimal level of f2 is higher if there is greater willingness to sacrifice 
employment today for more employment tomorrow, or the elasticity of substitution is 
high, the marginal productivity of f2 is high, and the rate of discount is low. Although f 
>f1, total financing requirement as a percentage of GDP will fall over time if the durable 
assets created raise productivity and GDP. 
 
VI. Applications 
A 
Figure 2: The costs and rewards of durable assets 
y1 
f2 
O T t 
0
21
t
fy  
),0( 121 fffy  
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The MGNREGA was passed in the Indian parliament in August 2005 giving the poor the 
legal right to 100 days of work in a year. Employment generated was to be used to build 
productive assets, but design features that could ensure the latter were missing, although 
special aspects of the scheme made these possible. If our first task is taken to be 
employment creation and the second using labour employed to create assets, our analysis 
can be applied to the MGNREGS.  
 
The scheme is a form of insurance but also a conscious attempt to create a new institution 
with better incentive features. The latter include universal targeting to remove 
bureaucratic discretion in allocation, public muster rolls to boost transparency; manual 
work to achieve self-targeting; the legal right to help ensure delivery. There is no dole but 
if no work is provided, a reduced payment has to be made. A ban on use of contractors 
reduces corruption, and direct funding by the Central Government reduces leakages. A 
distinction between central and local politicians, with the latter as the implementing 
authority, increases transparency and local accountability as our Result 1 indicates. 
Panchayats
7
 are responsible but are monitored by gram sabhas (village bodies) and 
social audits, encouraging local empowerment, awareness and ownership. Result 5 
demonstrates the contribution of those features to reducing leakages and corruption. The 
problem is that local institutions are strong in only a few States; strengthening others will 
take time. The scheme worked better in States where panchayats were functional, and not 
dominated by one political party (Menon, 2006). Principals can more closely monitor 
local level politicians if local institutions such as the gram sabha are strengthened and 
accounting systems improved. There can be better coordination with other local 
development plans. 
 
Result 2 and Result 3 show that bureaucrats will neglect tasks requiring relatively more 
effort. Politicians will also neglect them if they show results only in the long-term and if 
they can form smaller coalitions of voters benefiting from redistribution 
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 Since a panchayat is a village governing body a panchayat member would be a local politician in our 
model. 
 17 
But Result 4 implies that giving the bureaucrat incentives based on the production and 
quality of durable assets, and clarifying his duties to be in coordination and technical 
support will increase the chance of high quality rural infrastructure being built. It will 
also compensate for the technical weakness of panchayats. If their incentives were 
focused on the production of high quality durable assets, bureaucrats would compensate 
for the lack of skills at local levels through training and use of consultants. Normally, 
since a bureaucrat has to accomplish multiple tasks it is not possible to give him a precise 
objective. But the special feature of the MGNREGS, where employment is an input in the 
production of durable goods, makes this possible. Putting too much weight on the 
panchayats alone, that is, on the local politicians, leads to an overemphasis on 
employment. This happened in the first phase of the MGNREGS. Moreover, under 
greater monitoring as is possible at the village level, the local bureaucrat would put in 
more effort compared to the local politician. 
 
Result 4 also shows bureaucrats will work harder to establish their ability when 
dispersion in ability is high. In developing countries variation in officials‘ ability is high, 
and low incomes make them risk averse, so that an incentive conditional on expected 
ability would induce more effort. Since variation in ability required to create high quality 
assets is even higher, putting this as the B‘s mandate, will induce even higher effort. It 
would encourage healthy competition between B‘s to demonstrate their skills, and 
mitigate the decay in abilities that has come from pleasing politicians rather than doing a 
good job.  
 
Apart from creating incentives for the village level official, some reorganization of the 
bureaucracy is required; a bureaucrat as a CEO responsible for a cluster of villages can 
bring in consultants and coordinate with the district planning council mooted in the 
approach to the 11
th
 Five Year Plan (GOI, 2006). 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Institutions as rules of interaction create incentives that affect outcomes. North (2005, pp. 
55-58) argues that political markets are inherently imperfect because of complexity, high 
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cost of and low returns to information acquisition, and multiple principal agent problems 
between the voter and the legislator, the latter and the executive. Special interests tend to 
capture polities and push their advantage at the expense of the general interest. Then how 
does change occur? Are institutions with poor incentive structures locked in?  
 
But democracy also encourages an open-ended process of discovery that has an 
advantage in a world with fundamental uncertainty and change. Political preferences and 
opinions may be incorrect but they are contestable; interactive learning occurs 
continuously (Wohlemuth, 2003). The large sphere independent of majority control plays 
a major role in this (Hayek, 1960).  
 
The political-bureaucratic nexus in India after independence perverted incentives, but 
more openness, greater awareness of the electorate, NGO and judicial activism, and 
political competition is forcing change. As the proportion of poor shrink politicians 
cannot win elections based on consumption subsidies for that shrinking minority, they 
have to provide more public goods that have wider benefits. There is an opportunity to 
put in better, context-specific, incentive structures.  
 
Democracy, together with the greater openness, leads to an active internal debate that 
makes improvements in governance possible. The MGNREGS is a consequence of such 
debate and is part of institutional change that is reversing policy mistakes. Thus the 
Platteau and Hayami (1998) conjecture on the persistence of African underdevelopment 
does not apply. If incentives arise from structural factors such as natural or technological 
handicaps or traditional social norms, not from policy mistakes, they are difficult to 
reverse. But if policy mistakes set up dysfunctional institutions, like the pervasive 
controls in the Indian case, vested interests created can only delay change, they cannot 
prevent it.  
Ideas are part of this contestation and may help push the basic allocation of tasks between 
the politicians and the bureaucrat so the right incentives are set for players to compete at 
only those margins that raise productivity; for government to provide public goods but 
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limit the authority and discretion of government and of individual actors within 
government
8
. 
 
Hart et. al. (1997) point out that while private provision will always have lower costs and 
more innovation than public, quality in private provision may be lower if quality requires 
higher costs. The public sector activity has an inherent advantage in providing quality. If 
the second good in this paper is understood as quality, the analysis shows how focusing 
on quality in the provision of public goods improves incentives. Then the public sector‘s 
quality advantage is further sharpened. This is compatible with multiple interlinked 
objectives if quality is defined and given as the bureaucrat‘s target for each objective. 
The definition of quality must include quick response.  
 
The performance of emerging market governments in delivering local public services, 
especially those such as infrastructure, education and health that create physical and 
human capital has been poor. Quality is low because of low resources as well as poor 
incentive structures. If improving the latter enhances catch-up, it would increase 
resources with growth. It is crucial to find ways to improve delivery of public services, 
especially those with a longer-term impact on productivity. Our framework offers a 
suggestion towards this.  
 
Assessments of the MGNREGS have tended to focus on the employment creation.  Even 
where the latter has occurred, the creation of quality durable assets has not been at all 
satisfactory. The CAG (2007) report blames this on low levels of professional input. 
Bureaucratic inputs are missing in both quantity and quality. Even the staff provided for 
in the Act is sometimes not appointed
9
, and those that are there are demotivated. The 
incentive structures analyzed in this paper are urgently needed to improve its contribution 
to rural productivity.   
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 North (2005) puts these two as necessary factors for growth in any country.  
9
 The NREGA provides for one gram rozgar sewak for each gram panchayat; five gram panchayats get 
one technical assistant and there is to be a full time program officer at the block level. 
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The MGNREGS has features that make it possible to give clear incentives to bureaucrats 
and make a clear division of tasks between local, central politicians and bureaucrats. The 
precise definition of the bureaucrat‘s role, and his motivation, will be important to make 
it difficult for state governments to control the panchayats through the bureaucrat, to 
reduce an overemphasis on rules and procedures, and to induce productive contributions 
from the executive. The MGNREGS also has features built in to reduce corruption and 
improve delivery. The focus on labour intensive assets in ensures the share of finances 
reserved for employment creation is large, thus doubly ensuring the employment 
objective does not suffer even with assets as the objective. Asset creation increases the 
financing requirement initially but can reduce it over time. 
 
The revival of local self-government, improvement in productivity and rural public goods 
availability will give everyone an incentive to contribute and participate; the latter will 
not be limited, as it is at present, to the beneficiaries and the vultures of state welfare 
schemes. Village bodies can be expected to strengthen. 
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